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"OTHER ACTS" & CHARACTER EVIDENCE: PART I
Paul C. Giannelli
Albert J. Weatherhead Ill & Richard W. Weatherhead
Professor of Law, Case Western ReseNe University
Ohio Evidence Rule 404(B), which governs the admissibility of evidence of "other acts," is one of the most
litigated rules in federal and state practice. As one
commentator has noted:
The numbers alone tell the story: In most jurisdictions,
alleged errors in the admission of uncharged misconduct are the most frequent ground for appeal in criminal cases; in many states, such errors are the most
common ground for reversal; and the Federal Rule in
point, Rule 404(b), has generated more reported cases
than any other subsection of the rules. E. lmwinkelried,
Uncharged Misconduct Evidence viii (1984).
The frequency of litigation is related to the difficulty of
applying Rule 404(B) and the significant prejudice that
results when the rule is misapplied. "[U]ncharged
misconduct is perhaps the most misunderstood area of
evidence law." /d. See also 2 J. Wigmore, Evidence 246
(Chadbourn rev. 1979) ("bewildering variancesof rulings
in the different jurisdictions and even in the same jurisdiction").
Prior to the adoption of Ohio Rule 404(B), R.C. 2945.59
governed this issue. "The statute has been a source of
major confusion to attorneys and judges alike- even the
title itself being subject to some inherent misunderstanding." Herbert & Mount, Ohio's "Similar Acts Statute," 9
Akron L. Rev. 301 (1975). See also State v. Flonnory, 31
Ohio St.2d 124, 126, 285 N.E.2d 726, 729 (1972) ("Much
confusion about R.G. § 2945.59 might be avoided if it
were observed that nowhere therein do the words 'like' or
'similar' appear.").
In addition, the Ohio Supreme Court has written:
"Because R.C. 2945.59 and Evid. R. 404(B) codify an
exception to the common law with respect to other acts of
wrongdoing, they must be construed against admissibility, and the standard for determining admissibility of such
evidence is strict." State v. Broom, 40 Ohio St.3d 277, 533
N.E.2d 682 (1975) (syllabus), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1075
(1989).
"Other acts" evidence, however, cannot be understood
without an appreciation of the rules governing character
evidence. This is the first of two articles on "other acts"
evidence and character evidence. This article focuses
primarily on evidence of an accused character- when it
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is admissible and how it may be proved. The next article
examines the remaining issues on character (character
of a victim) and then considers "other acts" evidence.
CHARACTER EVIDENCE
Rule 404(A) governs the circumstantial use of character evidence, i.e., the admissibility of evidence of a
character trait to prove that a person acted in conformity
with that trait on a particular occasion. The rule generally
prohibits the circumstantial use of character evidencei.e., character as proof of conduct.
Three exceptions to this general prohibition are recognized; the exceptions relate to (1) a criminal defendant's
character, (2) a victim's character, and (3) a witness'
character. With respect to exceptions (1) and (2), it is the
accused's or victim's character at the time of the charged
offense that is relevant. In contrast, exception (3) involves
a witness' character at the time of trial.
Rule 404(A) specifies the conditions under which
character evidence may be admitted. The rule, however,
does not specify the methods of proof that may be used
to establish character. Methods of proof are governed by
Rule 405, which generally limits the methods of proof to
opinion and reputation evidence. Thus, Rule 404 must be
read in conjunction with Rule 405.

Federal Rule 404
Ohio Rule404 differs from Federal Rule 404 in several
important respects. First, the following phrase has been
added to Rule 404(A)(1) and (2): "however, in prosecutions for rape, gross sexual imposition, and prostitution,
the exceptions provided by statute enacted by the General Assembly are applicable." Consequently, in the specified cases the Ohio rape shield laws, R.C. 2907.02(0)
(rape) and 2907.05(0) (gross sexual imposition), and
prostitution provisions, 2907.26, override Rule 404. The
federal rape shield provision is found in Federal Rule
412; there is no Ohio Rule 412.
Second, Fed R. Evid. 404(B) was amended in 1991 to
require pretrial notice: "provided that upon request by
the accused, the prosecution in a criminal case shall
provide reasonable notice in advance of trial, or during
trial if the court excuses pretrial notice on good cause
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ThEfProflioition of Character Evidence
BuJE)494 governs only the circumstantial use of
character evidence. This use of character is sometimes
referr:eq tq:as "propensity" or "disposition" evidence. For
example; person's character for honesty would be
circumstalltlally relevant to a theft charge because it
could be argued that a person with an honest character
tends to act in conformity with that character and thus
would be. less likely to steal than aperson of dishonest
~,cJl~rapfe'f.~Sfiniliuly, it could be argued that a dishonest
per§oh tends to act in conformity with that character and
thlls:ls more likely to steal than a person with an honest
character.
'J.\:Itijbdgh character evidence may be probative, at
leasttb'sbrne cases, the courts generally have excluded
suctf.evidence because "it usually is laden with the
dangerous baggage of prejudice, distraction, time
consumption and surprise." C, McCormick, Evidence§
18f3,at554(3d ed. 1984).
The.Qhio•cases have also recognized these dangers.
lnState·v:Lytle, 48 Ohio St.2d 391, 358 N.E.2d 623
(1.916k\'l:1Catedon other grounds, 438 U.S. 910 (1978), the
Supr.eme:Courtcommented: "Although character is not
irrelevant, the danger of prejudice outweighs the probativevaJueofsuch evidence." /d. at 402. In State v. Curry,
430hio St.2d 66, 330 N.E.2d 720 (1975), the Court identified the. following dangers associated with the admission
ofocharacterevidence:
(lti,b~QYI:!rmrong tendency to believe the defendant
~:Q.ul11}(6f.J!iELCllarge merely because he is a person likelyto'do such acts; (2) the tendency to condemn not
.. b.~~~.s;~:.~e i~ belie\l~d. gui!!YE!_!_tle present charge but
'R~¢~4~'e . f1e has escaped punishment from other
offenses; (3) the injustice of attacking one who is not
prepart3dto demonstrate the attacking evidence is
fabrica,ted;and (4) the confusion of issues which might
resultfrofnbringing in evidence of other crimes./d. at
68, quoting Whitty v. State, 34 Wis.2d 278, 292, 149
N.W.2d557, 563 (1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 959 (1968).
Th~$EE(:lct11gers have crystallized into a general prohibitiohco'fi:the use of character evidence: "A hallmark of the
AriisriCari Ffimihal justice system is the principle that
proof.t!iatthe accused committed a crime other than the
onefof'WHich he is on trial is not admissible when its sole
ptitpb:s~~i$'-toshow the accused's propensity or iridination'tO'com[iit crime." /d. Rule 404 follows this view.

a

Charac,~r iiltssue
In most cases, character is not an element of a crime,
claim defense; its potential use is most often circumstantial. It is the circumstantial use of character that Rule
404(A) prohibits- i.e. character as proof of conduct. If,
however, character is an element of a crime, or affirmative defense (character in issue), the prohibition of Rule
404(A) does not apply. The federal drafters commented:
Character may itself be an element of a crime, claim,
or defense. A situation of this kind is commonly
referred to as "character in issue." Illustrations are: the
chastity of the victim under a statute specifying her
chastity as an element of the crime of seduction, or the
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competency of the driver in an action for negligently
entrusting a motor vehicle tb an incompetent driver. No
problem of the general relevancy of character
evidence is involved, and the present rule therefore
has no provision on the subject. Advisory Committee's
Note, Fed. R. Evid. 404.
See a/so Ohio §taft Note ("Rule 404 does not apply to
cases where character is an issue.").
Character in issue presents a fundamentally different
use of character evidence than the circumstantial use of
character. This distinction can be illustrated by comparing how character relates to the crime of rape and the
~crirneofseuuction;which isrecognized in some jurisdictions. A male· is guilty of seduction"if by means of a
promise ofmarriage he induces a female of previouslychaste character tci indulge in sex,jal intercourse with
him." R. Perkins; Criminal Law 385 (2d ed. 1969).
Thus, one of the elements of the crime of seduction is
"previously-chaste character." Character in such a case
is directly, rather than circumstantially, relevanfto an
element of the prime. The prose¢1JJipn isrequiredto
establish chaste character..In C()ntrast, cf1aste character
R_.C. 2907.02. Lack of
is not an element of rape.
consent is an element of rape, and the victim'~ chaste
character. may be circumstantially relevant to :this .
element; i.e., a woman with an unchaste character is
more likely to consent to intercoursethanawoman with a
chaste character. (Note that Ohio does not recognize
seduction al') a crime, arid the admissibility of a rape
victi111's character is controlled byR.C. 2907,02(0)).
As the Advisory Committee's No.te quoted above indicates, no provision in the Rules of Eviden<:;:e.governs
character in iss.ue. There is, ho~ever, a provision which
governs the methods of proofwher{character is in issue.
Rule 405(8) provides that in "cases in which character or
a trait of character ot a person is an essential element of
a charge, claim, or defense, proof mayalso be made of
specific instances of his conduct."
The Ohio Staff Note states: "Actions for libel, slander,
malicious prosecution, seduction, and assault and
battery have been delineated as cases in which character is an issue." In support of this statement, the Staff
Note cites Lakes v. Buckeye State Mutual Insurance
Assn., 110 Ohi()App. 115, 168.N.E.2d 895 (1959). In Lakes
the court stated:."The generally accepted rule excludes
character evidence in civil acfions, ... except in actions
for libel, slander, malicious prosecution, seduction or
assaultan9.batt,E:Jry, in which, by reason of the nature of
the action, the character or reputation of a party
becomes a matter in issue." /d. at 118. See also
Melanowski v. ~udy, 102 Ohio St. 153, 131 N.E. 360
(1921). Notwithstanding this authority, character is not "in
issue" in malicious prosecution or assault and battery
cases because character is not an element of the crime
or of a defense in these cases.

See

CHARACTER OF THE ACCUSED
Rule 404(A)(1) recognizes an exception to the general
prohibition against the admissibility of character
evidence. In a criminal case, the accused may offer
evidence of a pertinent trait of his character. Once the
accused introduces such evidence, the prosecution may
offer rebuttal character evidence.
Several additional points are important. First, it is the
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testify to the general reputation of the accused for truth
and veracity.... Such a reputation might properly be
shown in a case of perjury, but it is not a trait involved
in unlawful possession of liquor. He then attempted to
qualify a witness as to the "general reputation ... for
being a peaceable, quiet, law-abiding citizen." Objection was made.... The court sustained this objection,
observing that the crime charged was not one of
violence, and in this the court was right, for it is of
course true that bootlegging may be both peaceable
and quiet. /d. at 341-42.
Both Saba and Booker permit the introduction of the
general character trait of being a "law-abiding" person.
Such general character may not be encompassed by
Rule 404(A), since it is arguably not sufficiently "pertinent" to the crime charged. Nevertheless, the federal
cases have rejected such a limitation. See United States
v. Angelini, 678 F.2d 380 (1st Cir. 1983) (accused's
character as law-abiding citizen always admissible);
nited States v. Hewitt, 634 F.2d 277 (5th Cir. 1981)
(accused's character as law-abiding citizen always
admissible). See also Annat., 49 A.L.R. Fed. 478 (1980).

defendant's character at the time of the charged offense
that is relevant. See Wroe v. State, 20 Ohio St. 460, 473
(1870) ("evidence ... as to the bad character of the
defendant subsequent to the commission of the offense
ought to have been excluded."). Second, Rule 405(A)
limits the methods by which the accused may introduce
character evidence. Under that provision only opinion
arid reputation evidence, and not specific instances of
conduct, may be used. Third, in prosecutions for rape
and gross sexual imposition, R.C. 2907.02(0) and
2907.05(0) override Rule 404.
Rule 404(A)(1) did not change Ohio law. It has long
been the rule in Ohio that in "a criminal prosecution, until
a defendant offers evidence of his general good character or reputation, the state may not offer testimony of his
bad character or bad reputation." State v. Cochrane, 151
Ohio St. 128, 84 N.E.2d 742 (1949) (syllabus, para. 3); accord, State v. Adams, 53 Ohio St.2d 223, 374 N.E.2d
137 (1978), vacated on other grounds, 439 U.S. 811 (1978);
State v. Curry, 43 Ohio St.2d 66, 330 N.E.2d 720 (1975);
State v. Hector; 19 Ohio St2d 167, 249 N.E.2d:912 (1969);
State v. Markowitz, 138 Ohio St. 106, 33 N.E.2d 1 (1941);
Saba v. State, 119 Ohio St. 231, 163 N.E. 28-(1928};
.
Hamilton v. State, 34 Ohio St. 82 (1877); Griffin v. State,
14 Ohio St. 55 (1862).

METHODS OF PROOF
Rule 405 specifies the permissible methods of proving
character. It governs how character may be proved but
not when character may be proved. The latter issue is
typically governed by Rule 404(A). If character evidence
is admissible pursuant to Rule 404(A)(1) (accused's
character) or Rule 404(A)(2) (victim's character), Rule
405(A) provides that reputation or opinion evidence may
be used to prove that character. Specific instances of
conduct may not be used to prove character but may be
the subject of cross-examination.

Jury Instruction on Character
.
In some cases, evidence of good character offered by
the accused may have a significant impact. As the U.S.
Supreme Court has noted: "The circumstances may be
such that an established reputation for good character, if
it is relevant to the issue, would alone create a reasonable doubt, although without i.t other evidence would be
convincing." Edgington v. United States, 164U.S. 361,
366 (1896); accord, Michelson v. United States, 335 U$.
469, 476 (1948) ('[S]uch testimony alone, in some circumstances, may be enough to raise a reasonable doubt of
guilt ...").
See also Ohio Jury Instructions§ 411.05 (character and
reputation).

Reputation Evidence
Rule 405(A) permits the use of reputation evidence to
prove character if character evidence is admissible
under one of the Rule 404(A) exceptions. Reputation is
not synonymous with character; it is only one method of
proving character. "There is no doubt that counsel and
even courts have sometimes forgetfully treated character
and reputation as synonymous .... Character of a person
is that which he really is, rather than what he is reputed to
be ..." State v. Dickerson, 77 Ohio St. 34, 53, 82 N.E.
969, 971 (1907).
The pre-Rules Ohio cases had recognized the use of
reputation to prove character. See State v. Elliott, 25 Ohio
St.2d 249, 267 N.E.2d 806 (1971), vacated on other
grounds, 408 U.S. 939 (1972); State v. Cochrane, 151
Ohio St. 128, 84 N.E.2d 742 (1949); Ohio Jury Instructions§ 411.05 (character and reputation).
The offering party, however, must lay a proper foundation, establishing the witness' qualifications to testify
about a person's reputation in the community: "The
preliminary qualifications of the [character] witness must
be such as to advise the court and the jury that he has
the means of knowing such general reputation of the
[person] in the community...."Radke v. State, 107 Ohio
St. 399, 140 N.E. 586 (1923) (syllabus, para. 1). See also
State v. Rivers, 50 Ohio App.2d 129, 361 N.E.2d 1363
(1977); State v. Johnson, 57 Ohio Abs. 524, 94 N.E.2d
791 (App. 1950), appeal dismissed, 154 Ohio St. 236
(1950).

Pertinent Character Traits
· The exception recognized in Rule 404(A)(1) permits the
accused to introduce only evidence of a "pertinent trait of
his character." In other words, the character trait must be
relevant to the crime charged.
A number of Ohio cases have recognized this rule. In
Griffin v. State, 14 Ohio St. 55 (1862), the Supreme Court
held that "[t]he general character which is the proper
subject of inquiry should also have reference to the
nature of the charge against the defendant. Thus, in the
present case, the defendant being charged with a crime
necessarily importing dishonesty, called witnesses who
gave evidence tending to show a general good character
for honesty." /d. at 63. See also Saba v. State, 119 Ohio
St. 231, 239, 163 N.E. 28,31 (1928) ("In a murder case,
such reputation must relate to his being a peaceable,
law-abiding citizen.").
In Booker v. State 33 Ohio App. 338, 169 N.E. 588
(1929), the court observed:
In showing his character, however, [the defendant] is
confined to that trait of character that is inconsistent
with guilt of the offense charged in the indictment. The
accused in this case attempted to qualify a witness to
3

--:Ther-commt:rnity:wtiich~is-the contextforthe witness~·
knoWledge of reputation may not be too "remote," i.e., a
p!ac.e .·~wberl:l [tbeaccusE:Jd] has never lived, and where
hEfis riot shown to be generally known or acquainted."
Griffin v. State, 14 Ohio St. 55 (1862) (syllabus, para. 5).
Furthermore, it is knowledge of the accused's reputation
at the tirpe of the charged offense that is relevant for this
purpose.
Rule 803(20) recognizes a hearsay exception for reputation evidence concerning character.

Specific lnstancesoH3onduct ·
Evidence of specific instances of conduct could be an
effective: n:Je8JlS ofproving character. For example,
evidence tna:fa pE:Jrsbn stole money on a previous occasion would be relevant in ascertaining that person's
character for honesty. Although evidence of specific
instances of conduct may be the strongest evidence of
character, Ruie 40S(Afdoes not permit its use when
character isadmittedunderRule 404(A).
This rule fqllows prior Ohio law. See State v. Cochrane,
151 Ohio St. 128, 134, 84 N.E2d 742, 745 (1949); Hamilton v. State, 34 Ohio St. 82, 86 {1877); (1949); Hamilton v.
· Statei'34'®HiO'iSt;82f86.(1877);Griffin v. State, 14 Ohio
St.55;63f1862);. . .
_
The rationale;fprthisprohibition was commented upon
in State.y. Eltiott, 25 ~bio St;2d·249, 267 N.E.2d 806
(1971), vacated;qnothe.ngrounds, 408 U.S. 939 (1972):
"The admissiOn of l:lUCll evidence would raise collateral
issues and cliv~tt the minds of the jurors from the matter
at hand.ltJs·manitestlyunfair to compel a party to defend
· sp.ecitic aGtS1:lJ1~gedfas proof otbad reputation or character." /d. at 253;:-Se~'also:Advisory Committee's Note, Fed.
Ft Evid. 405{Such evidence "possesses the greatest
capacity to arouse prejudice, to confuse, to surprise, and
·tocbilsurnetime;'').
Rule 405(A)supersedesR.C; 2945.56. That statute
permits the prosecution to rebutdefense character
evidence by introducing' evidence of the accused's prior
convictions for crimes involving moral turpitude. Because
prior conviction~ are based on specific instances of
conduct, the statute-is inconsistent with the rule.

Opinion Evidence
Rule 405(A) permits the use of opinion, as well as
reputation; evidence to prove character if character is
adm.issible under c>ne of. the Rule 404(A) exceptions~ .·
Thus; awitnesswho is sufficiently acquainted with the
ace: used may give an optnion of that accused's character.
TheOhioStaff Npte indicat~:~s tllat Rule 405 "expands
Ohiblaw by permitting the use of opinion evidence as to
character.... At common law,pr_oof of character was.
only byevidenceof.reputation."The.Ohio cases; h!Jwever, are not clear on this point. Although character could
be proved only by reputation evidence for impeachment
purposes (see Cowan v. Kinney~ 33 Ohio St. 422 (1878);
Bucklin v. State, 20 Ohio 18 (1851)), the same rule had not
been applied cpnsistently when c:haracter was admitt~d
on the merits.
..
Fqrexample, in State v. Dickerson, 77 Ohio St. 34,82
N.E. ~69 {1907), the SupremeCourtcommented:
[W]e think the acc1,1sed is not confined to his reput<!!ion
for a certain trait of character involved in the char@e,
but may, by those most intimate with him during 1:1
course of years, spread before. the jur.y his real self,
-·toucfiTrfg'fliequantyofcondud involved hthe issue.
Such familiar and intimate acquaintance may enable
his neighbors to read him as they would a familiar ·
book. /d. at 53-54.
See also Saba v. State, 119 Ohio St. 231,239, 240, 163
N.E. 28, 31 (1928); Gandolfo v. State, 11 Ohio St. 114
(1860).
In any event, Rule 405(A) clearly authorizes the use of
opinion evidence to prove character. The justification for
tbe ruie is set forth in the Advisory Committee's Note to·
Federal RI.Jie 40p.
· . .
.
In recognizing opinion as a means of proving character, the rule departs from usual contemporary practice
in favor of that of an earlier day. See 7 Wigmore § 1~f86,
pointing.p,uUaC1UhE:l.earliE:~r pr<u:;tice permitted opinion .
and arguing strongly for evidence based on personal
knoWledge arid belief as contrasted with "the secondhand, jr~espo'llsible Prc:Jd_uct of multiplied guesses and
gossip whk:h we-term 'reputation.'·" It seems likely that
the persistence of rep1,1tation evidence is due to its
largely being opinion in disguise.... If character is
defined as the kind of person one is, then account must
be taken of varying ways of arriving at the estimate.
These may rallge from the opinion of the employer who
has found the man honest to the opinion of the
psychiatrist based upon examination and testing.
As with reputation evidence, to introduce opinion
evidence the offering party must qualify the character
witness by laying a foundation showing that the witness
is sufficiently acquainted with the accused to have
formed an opinion about that person's character.

'PROSECUTION REBUTTAL
The prosecution can respond to character evidence
offered by the defense in either of two ways: (1) offering
Its owifreBi.itiaTcllaracfei-Witnesses, and (2) crossexamining the character witnesses offered by the
defense.
Prosecution Character Witnesses
Once the accused has introduced evidence of a pertinent character trait, the prosecution may offer character
evidence in·rebuttal.
The same li;liitations thaUrpply to character evidence
offered by the<\lefense apply to the prosecution. First, the
character traittliaris the subject of rebuttal must be
"pertinent" to~the crii'necharged. For example, in a theft
ca:sethedefehse chi:uacterwitnesses should be allowed
totesHfy concefning Only the defendant's character for
honesty. Simil~rly, the rebuttal witnesses' testimony
should be limited to· the same trait, i.e., dishonesty.
Second, Rule 405(A) controls the methods of proof
which are available.for the presentation of rebuttal
character evidence. Thus, the prosecution, like the
accused, is limited to opinion or reputation evidence.
Cross-Examination
The prosecution also may challenge defense character evidence through cross-examination. Rule 405(A)
provides: "On cross-examination, inquiry is allowable
into relevant specific instances of conduct." Thus, a reputation or opinionwitness may be asked on crossexamination "if he has heard" or "if he knows" of specific acts. The cross-examiner, however, must take the
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witness' answer; that is, extrinsic evidence of the specific
acts is not admissible.
In State v. Elliott, 25 Ohio St.2d 249, 26/ N.E.2d 806
(1971), vacated on other grounds, 408 U.S. 939 (1972), the
Supreme Court commented:
A character witness may be cross-examined as to
the existence of reports of particular acts, vices, or
associations of the person concerning whom he has
testified which are inconsistent with the reputation
attributed to him by the witness- not to establish the
truth of the facts, but to test the credibility of the
witness, and to ascertain what weight or value is to be
given his testimony. Such inconsistent testimony tends
to show either that the witness is unfamiliar with the
reputation concerning which he has testified, or that
his standards of what constitute good repute are
unsound. /d. (syllabus, para. 2).
See also State v. Howard, 57 Ohio App.2d 1, 385 N.E.2d
308 (1978); State v. Polhamus, 62 Ohio Abs. 113, 106
N.E.2d 646 (App. 1951).
.
The court in Elliott cited Michelson v. United States,
335 U.S. 469 (1948), which is the leading case on this
subject. The accused in Michelson was charged with
bribery of an IRS agent. The U.S. Supreme Court upheld
the prosecutor's right to ask defense character witnesses
whether they had heard about the accused's twentyyear-old conviction for a trademark violation and twentyseven-year-old arrest for receiving stolen property. These
questions were permitted in order to test the witnesses'
familiarity with the accused's reputation in the community. Justice Jackson used the following illustration in
Michelson:
A classic example in the books is a character witness
in a trial for murder. She testified she grew up with
defendant, knew his reputation for peace and quiet,
and that it was good. On cross-examination she was
asked if she had heard that the defendant had shot
anybody and, if so, how many. She answered, "three
or four," and gave the names of two but could not recall
the names of the others. She still insisted, however,
that he was of "good character." The jury seems to
have valued her information more highly than her judgment, and on appeal from conviction the crossexamination was held proper. 335 U.S. at 479 n. 16.

by counsel for the very purpose of injuring by indirection
a character which they are forbidden directly to attack in
that way; they rely upon the mere putting of the question
(not caring that it is answered negatively) to convey their
covert insinuation." 3A J. Wigmore, Evidence 921 (Chadbourn rev. 1970).
· Consequently, the courts have required that this type
of cross-examination be conducted in good faith; that is,
the prosecutor have a good faith basis in fact for asking
the question. See C. McCormick, Evidence§ 191, at 569
(3d ed. 1984); 3A J. Wigmore, Evidence 921 (Chadbourn
rev. 1970).
The Michelson Court recognized that this type of
cross-examination placed a "heavy responsibility on trial
cpurts to protect the practice from any misuse." Michelson v. United States, 335 U.S. at 480. The Court went on
to point out that the trial judge in that case
took pains to ascertain, out of presence of the jury, that
the target of the question was an actual event, which
would probably result in some comment among
acquaintances if not injury to the defendant's reputation. He satisfied himself that counsel was not merely
taking a random shot at a reputation imprudently
exposed or asking a groundless question to waft an
unwarranted innuendo into the jury box.ld. at 481.
Similarly, the Ohio Supreme Court in Elliot remarked: "If
the defendant had never been convicted of a felonious
assault, such question by the prosecutor, being made in
bad faith, would be the predicate for error ...." 25 Ohio
St. 2d at 253.
Pertinent Character Trait
There are additional limitations on the prosecutor's
cross-examination. Only acts which bear some relationship to the particular character trait offered by the defendant can properly be raised on cross-examination. For
example, if the character witness testifies about the
defendant's character for honesty, the witness cannot be
cross-examined about violent acts. See Michelson v.
United States, 335 U.S. at 483-84; State v. Kraut, 6 Ohio
App.3d 5, 7, 451 N.E.2d 515 (1982) (witnesses who testify.
about truthful character cannot be cross-examined about
drug crimes).
Remoteness
In addition, acts which are too remote are not the proper subject of cross-examination. The question concerning the twenty-seven-year-old arrest was permitted in
Michelson only because "two of [the character] witnesses dated their acquaintance with defendant as
commencing thirty years before the trial." /d. at 484.

The Good Faith Requirement
The risk that the jury will use such information for an
mproper purpose- to show character- is great
1otwithstanding a limiting instruction. Moreover, the
lractice possesses the potential for abuse. "This method
lf inquiry or cross-examination is frequently resorted to
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